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DEFINING AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES
Abstract: This paper explores the efforts of the audit
profession to dominate definitions of their roles and
responsibilities throughout the last two decades. The
paper considers alternative definitions of these roles and
responsibilities as forwarded by others and the
justifications and defenses provided by auditors to
legitimize their conceptions of these matters.
The U.S. auditing profession maintains that its work enhances the
reliability and credibility of financial statements and thereby facilitates
the operation of capital markets. Although the profession has
benefitted greatly from legislated requirements for annual audits, it
has also fought forcefully to dominate the definitions of its tasks,
roles, and responsibilities—to perform audits as it sees fit. In
developing and maintaining a particular position relative to their
responsibilities in conducting financial audits, auditors have attempted
to tell the public whom they serve as well as the types of tasks that
the public may reasonably expect the profession to undertake.
This insistence upon a self-definition of tasks, roles and
responsibilities should not be surprising. With the passage of the
securities acts and licensing statutes by individual states, auditors
have demarcated the attestation of financial statements as an element
of their professional jurisdiction. Through such demarcations,
professions attempt to gain legitimate control over particular kinds of
work [Abbott, 1988]. They claim the right to perform work within
their jurisdiction as they deem appropriate and also to dominate
public definitions of their professional tasks. In effect, professions
are asking the public to trust that they know best how to define their
professional roles and responsibilities and how to accomplish their
professional tasks. Carmen Blough [1939, p. 165] succinctly captured
this position in discussing why auditors should refer to audit
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procedures "deemed" appropriate rather than exhaustively listing the
procedures performed during an audit in the audit certificate (i.e.
report):
[These words] say 'You must trust me to do a good job as an
accountant. No detailed recital that I might make of the
auditing procedures followed would tell you enough to make
it worth your while to read them. If you cannot trust me,
you had best not depend upon my certificate, but if you can
bring yourself to the frame of mind where you believe I will
do what an honest, capable and independent public accountant
should do, then you may rely upon it.'
In exchange for defining its professional work and
responsibilities, however, a profession must also be seen to perform
the work defined as contained in its jurisdiction. In other words, an
obligation is imposed upon a profession to do what it says it will do.
For some professions, this obligation is perhaps difficult to monitor.
For example, do lawyers actually serve the needs of justice, their
primary jurisdictional claim [Abbott, 1988].1 For other professions
such as auditing and accounting, "failures" to accomplish professional
work may be highly visible and the definition of a "failure" contested.
Audits are seen to fail. Indeed, the history of auditing might be
interpreted by some as a history of auditing failures [Power, 1992]. But
when is an audit to be described as a failure, and when do such failures
suggest weaknesses in auditing practices or failures by the auditing
profession more generally? Are sudden and unexpected corporate
bankruptcies evidence of an audit failure? What of the failure to detect
material fraud? When may audits described as failed be interpreted to
imply the roles and responsibilities of auditors should be redefined? The
answers to these questions no doubt depend upon to whom they are
addressed.
The significances or meanings to be attached to an audit opinion, the
only visible sign that audit work has been performed, remain ambiguous.
Does a "clean" report imply that fraud was absent or that no fraud was
detected? Can one infer from a "clean" report that a corporation is
financially sound and can be expected to continue its operations into the
future? Or does a "clean" report refer only to the use of GAAP in
constructing financial statements? Each (or all) of these meanings may
be and have been assigned to the "clean" audit report. Yet, they carry

1
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significantly different implications for the roles and responsibilities of the
auditor. If a "clean" report is interpreted to mean no fraud is present,
then the auditor has a responsibility to detect fraud, to search actively to
find it. If it implies only that no fraud was detected, then the auditor may
not be seen as responsible for searching for fraud. If the report is
interpreted to imply that a company will continue to exist, then the
auditor must assess its future viability before issuing a report.
In recent decades, considerable attention has been given to the
existence of an "expectations gap" between what "the public" believes
auditors should do and how auditors have defined their roles and
responsibilities. Disagreement and controversy have surrounded the
significance and content to be accorded the term "auditors"roles and
responsibilities". This gap has been explored in the accounting
literature. For example, Humphrey et al. [1992] have critically
examined the response of the profession to this gap, primarily in the UK
context. Hooks [1991] has considered efforts to match public concerns
with auditor actions, and suggested that the profession may benefit from
public ignorance. These and other authors have raised questions
regarding whether auditors act in the public interest when they adhere to
extant standards rather than assess the economic consequences of audited
transactions [Merino & Kenny, 1994; Martins & McEnroe, 1992]; when
they respond to public outcries in particular ways [Fogarty, 1996;
Byington & Sutton, 1991; Mills & Bettner, 1992] or even whether they
meet their own definitions of serving the public interest [Sikka et al.,
1989]. In this paper, I hope to make a modest contribution to this
literature by examining the efforts of the U.S. accounting profession to
dominate definitions of its roles and responsibilities during the last three
decades. These efforts have occurred amidst tension between the
perceived obligations of auditors to perform particular tasks and their
declared "rights" to define such tasks. In part, this tension has arisen
from the particular cultural values [Abbott, 1988] with which auditors
have aligned their work. The next section briefly considers some of these
values in an historical context and the justifications employed by
auditors to legitimize their work. It also outlines the ways that auditors
defined their professional tasks during the 1970s. In the subsequent
sections, I consider the challenges that have been posed to these
definitions and the responses of auditors to these challenges, from the
1970s to the 1990s. The final section contains some concluding
observations.
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WHY ARE FINANCIAL AUDITS "VALUABLE"?
In the 1970s, auditors described their role as one of enhancing the
credibility of financial information and furthering the operations of an
effective capital market [Carmichael, 1974]. This claim bears a striking
resemblance to those made in the 1930s regarding the necessity for
enhanced financial disclosure by corporations. Prior to the 1930s,
corporations were required neither to submit annual reports to
government agencies or shareholders nor to have such reports audited.
Corporate managers "regarded their company's affairs as private and
privileged" [McCraw, 1984, p. 166].2 Indeed, "Mystery [i.e.
nonreporting] was treated as an asset, on the grounds that publicity
would be too informing to competitors" [Ripley, 1927, pp. 178-179].
During the economic depression, corporate secrecy was increasingly seen
as a threat to the functioning of capitalism undermining the legitimacy
of the securities industry [McCraw, 1984]. For some, the "worst
damage" of the Depression was the "wholesale betrayal of confidence by
investors" [Andrews, 1932, p. 354], including "unrestrained financial
exploitations which create[d] fictitious values never justified by
earnings" [Roosevelt, 1933, p. 226].
Regaining investor confidence was deemed essential to the economic
recovery of the U.S. [Roosevelt, 1933], and enhanced disclosure by
corporations was seen as one means to this end. It was in this climate of
economic depression and distrust that the 1933 Securities Act ("Truth
in Securities") was enacted. The act was described as a response to "the
reticence of financiers" [Rep. Rayburn, quoted in McCraw, 1984, p.
166], and required that specific disclosures accompany the issuance of
new securities. The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act extended these
disclosure requirements to encompass all publicly traded companies and
established the Securities and Exchange Commission. The New Deal
legislation also required that the disclosures and reports submitted by
corporations be audited. These audits would enable a new era of "caveat
vendor" [Andrews, 1932, p. 359], supplanting that of caveat emptor
which had been prevalent in previous decades. After all, "it is generally
regarded that an independent audit of any business is a good thing" [Col.
Carter during Congressional hearings on the Securities Act, quoted in
Carey, 1960, p. 187]. Through enhanced disclosure, audit, and other
practices, confidence and trust were to be restored in the operations of

2
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the securities markets.3 The practice of auditing was thus closely linked
to the cultural value of credible financial reporting seen as necessary for
the securities markets.
In the 1970s, audits were still described as affirming the truthfulness
of financial statements and ensuring that financial statements were
"fairly presented" [Palmer in New York Times, April 6, 1975]. This
function was loosely linked to various audit practices including the
review and testing of company records and the procedures and controls
used to assemble financial information, approval of the use of various
accounting principles, and examination of financial statements to ensure
they contained no material misstatements, omissions, or misleading
presentations of data [Silverman, 1971]. Through the application of
such practices, the auditor was to render a professional opinion "as to
the reliability of a company's financial records. . . judged in terms of the
adequacy of records from which the information emanates and the
acceptability of technical accounting principles involved in recording
transactions" [Silverman, 1971]. In describing their role in this way,
auditors maintained that the purpose of an audit was to ensure that
financial statements fairly presented the financial position and condition
of a business entity and that the notion, "fairly presented", was a
function of the acceptability of various accounting principles. The audit
profession did not accept responsibility for the preparation of financial
statements. Instead, these statements were declared to be the
representations of management and the responsibility of management
[Mautz and Sharaf, 1961].4
The terms used to describe the auditors' role were quite
ambiguous—ensuring "fair presentation" and the "truthfulness" of
financial reporting. While such ambiguity serves to suggest the expertise
and knowledge required to conduct an audit properly through the
exercise of professional judgment [Power, 1992], it also increases the
possibility of multiple and conflicting interpretations of these terms as
well as multiple and conflicting assessments as to whether auditors had
accomplished these ends in specific instances. What obligations did the
profession maintain were undertaken by auditors? Could financial
statements be described as "fairly presented" when an auditor failed to

3
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detect fraud? With fraud, revenues and assets might be overstated or
expenses and liabilities understated. If information about these
accounting categories could be said to represent the financial condition
and operations of an entity but the categories themselves were
"inaccurate," then could one argue that the financial statements fairly
presented the operating results andfinancialcondition of the entity? Did
the term "fairly present" which appeared in the standard audit opinion
imply that financial statements were free of material errors resulting
from fraud or other illegal acts?
Prior to the passage of the securities acts, the primary purpose of an
audit was to "ascertain the actual financial condition and earnings of an
enterprise," with the minor object of detecting and preventing fraud and
errors [Montgomery, 1921-22, pp. 19, 21, and 1927, pp. 23, 25].
However, by 1940, the detection of fraud was no longer described as an
object of the audit, as this would "require an examination of such detail
that its cost... would be prohibitive" [Montgomery, 1940, p. 13].5 By
the late 1940s, it was argued that audits were not designed to detect
fraud, nor were auditors responsible for its detection [Montgomery,
1949; Kohler, 1947].
Throughout the 1970s, auditors continued to maintain that the
concept of "fairly present" as defined by the profession imposed a very
limited obligation upon auditors to detect fraud or other illegal acts.
Some argued that it was "sheer ignorance to think the purpose of the
audit is to detect fraud" and, in their engagement letters with corporate
management, audit firms often included explicit statements to indicate
they were not in the business of detecting fraud [Hershman, 1974; Blinn,
1977]. According to the professional literature of the time, auditors were
responsible for detecting fraud only when such detection could occur
through the application of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS)
[Holdren, 1969; Carmichael, 1975; Kapnick, 1976]. Yet, GAAS was
seen to guide the conduct of "ordinary" audit examinations—those in
which fraud was not thought to occur. Indeed, audits were assumed to
be performed in a corporate environment of honesty and integrity
[Solomon and Muller, 1977] and auditors were not required to presume
that fraud had occurred while conducting an audit [Kapnick, 1976]. As
a consequence, the application of GAAS could not be "relied upon to
assure the discovery of either defalcations and similar irregularities or
deliberate management misrepresentations" [Carmichael, 1975, p. 79].

5
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From this perspective, if auditors properly applied GAAS in an
engagement but failed to detect fraud, then no audit failure had occurred
even though the financial statements might contain errors. The audit
profession thus limited its definition of an audit failure to include only
those cases in which an auditor failed to apply GAAS. In doing so, it
maintained that auditor performance and their roles and responsibilities
were to be assessed only by reference to the rules and guidelines
established by the profession. Auditors were to be evaluated on their
own terms rather than by reference to the roles and responsibilities that
nonauditors might believe should guide the conduct of an audit.
In defining an audit failure as a failure to follow GAAS, the
profession was promoting and claiming its right to establish definitions
of "fairly present" and to perform its work as it saw fit [Abbott, 1988].
Even as it continued to call upon broader cultural values such as the
credibility of financial statements to justify and legitimate the usefulness
of an audit, the profession also attempted to control and define the terms
used to assess whether these values had been achieved. In this way, and
through these definitions, the audit profession was attempting to
construct and define the "proper" roles and responsibilities of auditors.
Furthermore, with its limited definition of an audit failure, the profession
was apparently attempting to equate the performance of an audit in
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that the cultural value of
credible financial statements had been achieved [Abbott, 1988]. If
audited, financial statements were to be seen as credible. The profession
was attempting to preclude public discussions of the meanings and
significances to be assigned to the audit and, instead, sought to define
those terms seen to provide the audit process with value in ways desired
by the profession, and thereby to control the significance of work
performed within its jurisdiction.
QUESTIONING THE DEFINITIONS PROVIDED BY
AUDITORS—1970s
Although the profession forwarded its desired definition of an audit
failure and thereby of a "quality" audit, the revelation of scandals such
as Westec, Yale Express, and Bar-Chris [Why Accountants, Business
Week, 1971] as well as National Student Marketing [Wall Street
Journal, October 29, 1974], Beverly Hills Bancorp [Wall Street
Journal, August 14, 1974], and Equity Funding [Wall Street Journal,
January 8, 1975; January 10, 1975; December 18, 1975] raised
questions about the propriety of the auditing profession's definitions,
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including questions about its roles and responsibilities in detecting fraud.
Some commentators suggested that if audits could fail to detect a fraud
of the magnitude of Equity Funding, then as currently conducted they
might have little value [Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1974; Hershman,
1974]. The Equity Funding scandal was seen to place intense pressure
upon auditors to accept a duty to detect fraud [Wall Street Journal,
January 8, 1975].
Members of the SEC also criticized the profession's position on
fraud. Some commissioners considered auditors in a strategic position
to "nip fraud before it blossoms" and criticized them for failing to heed
"red flags" that were indicative of potential fraud [Wall Street Journal,
July 12, 1974]. In referring to several major cases of substantial
management fraud, one SEC commissioner commented:
In most of these cases, the fraud was one which was designed
to present a misleading picture of results through transactions
with related parties or through outright fictitious
transactions... If the accounting profession adopts the view that
auditors should never be responsible for detecting management
fraud, there is little likelihood that increased imposition of the
truly onerous and unfair burdens on the accounting profession
can be prevented. Standards can best be promulgated by the
profession and can serve to allay fears that auditors will become
insurers against all forms of management fraud, however
carefully concealed [News Report, Journal of Accountancy,
1973a, pp. 14,16].
He urged the profession to accept responsibility for fraud detection [New
York Times, October 17, 1973] as did the Commission more generally:
"We believe that in examinations for corporations whose securities are
held by the public, accountants can be expected to detect gross
overstatements of assets and profits, whether resulting from fraud or
otherwise" [quoted in Hershman, 1974, p. 53].
In addition to concerns about auditor responsibilities to detect
material errors, auditors were criticized for a perceived failure to
maintain their independence from their corporate clients [It's Time to
Call, Fortune, 1970; Why Accountants, Business Week, 1971]. These
questions were particularly troubling as they suggested that auditors had
failed to meet their own definitions of a "quality" audit. Did auditors
serve their corporate clients or act in the public interest by protecting
investors and creditors [The Big Bath, Newsweek, 1970; Why
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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Accountants, Business Week, 1971; New York Times, November 5,
1973]? Were auditors "too friendly" with management and should they
continued to be hired as employees by their former clients [New York
Times, November 18, 1972]? Had heightened competition within the
profession resulted in an increasing unwillingness by auditors to insist on
"compliance" with financial accounting standards and to "pursue
incompetence" [Letter to the Editor, New York Times, December 7,
1975]? Was a "more muscular audit" needed to alleviate pressures on
auditors to provide creative accounting answers for clients who
otherwise threatened to change auditors [New York Times, April 14,
1974]?6
Although accounting writers indicated an awareness of criticisms
that auditors were not adequately independent of corporate clients, that
accounting results disclosed too little, and that financial statements were
too complex [e.g., Seidler, 1973], the general response of the profession
to these criticisms can be summarized in a single phrase: "You just don't
understand." Even as auditors continued to argue that audits enhanced
the credibility of financial information, they also claimed that audits were
not designed to detect fraud. While auditors insisted they could enhance
the credibility of financial reporting without actively searching for fraud,
the public appeared to disagree with this position and apparently
expected that significant or material fraud would be detected by an
audit.7 In contrast to the definition of an audit failure forwarded by the
profession, the public defined such failures as including those audits

6

Apparently, the Securities Acts were not as effective in allowing
auditors to escape the "grip" of management as was originally hoped
[McCraw, 1984], nor were the rules on independence sufficient to achieve
this end despite an awareness by the profession of the need for public
confidence in the "unbiased and selfless character of the public accountant's
role" [Miranti, 1990, pp. 176-177].
7

Forexample, a 1974 Arthur Andersen & Co. survey "indicated that 66%
of the investing public believe[d] that the most important function of the
public accounting firm's audit of a corporation is to detect fraud" [cited in
AICPA, 1978, p. 31]. Further, Baron et al. [1977] reported survey results in
which nonauditors indicated higher levels of auditor responsibility for the
detection of deliberate material falsifications than did auditors. With the
exception of auditors, the survey respondents also indicated a preference for
extending auditor responsibilities with respect to the detection of deliberate
material falsifications of financial statements.
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which did not detect material fraud or errors. This difference in
definition called into question the propriety of the practices both followed
and defined by auditors in conducting audits. The controversy
surrounding Equity Funding and other corporate failures as well as
questions about the independence of auditors suggested that the
profession had not succeeded in equating the performance of an audit in
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that credible financial
reporting had been produced. These corporate failures highlighted
differences between the ways in which the auditing profession linked the
audit to credible financial reporting and how the public interpreted this
linkage.
The profession interpreted these criticisms as indicative of a failure
by the public to understand the roles and responsibilities which it had
defined. The public was described as misinformed about the services
customarily performed by CPAs [Solomon et al., 1976, p. 68]. These
differences between public interpretations and auditor interpretations of
how an audit was to intersect with the production of credible financial
statements were construed by auditors as indicative of a need to educate
the public. A properly educated public would accept that audits could
enhance the credibility of financial statements without serving as
guarantees of the accuracy of financial statements [Hershman, 1974].
In emphasizing the necessity for educating the public, the profession
attempted to avoid reassessing its own definitions of its roles and
responsibilities. Instead, confronted with these differences and
interpretations, the audit profession renewed its efforts to dominate the
signficances to be assigned to its roles and responsibilities and to
persuade the public to accept the value of an audit as defined by
auditors. In particular, the profession sought to manage impressions,
emphasized better communication by auditors, called upon other cultural
values to justify its position, and outlined expertise and its limits.
Managing Impressions. Through various means, the AICPA
attempted to manage public impressions about the roles and
responsibilities of the audit profession. In 1973, the AICPA Board of
Directors announced the formation of a special committee "to study
whether the auditing standards, which are currently considered
appropriate and sufficient in the examination of financial statements [by
the AICPA], should be changed in the light of Equity Funding and to
report its conclusions to the Board of Directors and the auditing
standards executive committee" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy,
1973b, p. 14]. The Institute justified forming the committee by
indicating that "the Institute shares the general public concern about the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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Equity Funding disaster, which caused enormous losses to investors and
creditors apparently by reason of massive and collusive fraud" [News
Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1973b, p. 14]. Although some
individuals claimed that no lessons could be learned from such a poorly
conducted audit engagement, others suggested that the fraud was
possible because Equity Funding employees had exploited blind spots
and crevices in existing audit practices [Wall Street Journal, January 8,
1975; Tipgos, 1977].
This AICPA special committee later concluded that the Equity
Funding fraud could have been detected using existing auditing standards
and that the professional position with respect to its responsibility to
detect fraud was sound [Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1975; Olsen,
1982]. For the committee, the Equity Funding scandal was not
interpreted as evidence of the profession's failure to perform appropriate
tasks but rather as a failure by individual auditors to follow established
rules and guidelines. Even so, the committee urged that the standards
relating to fraud detection be restated in more positive terms to avoid
public misunderstandings of the audit and to reemphasize that audits
might detect fraud but were not specifically designed to do so [Olsen,
1982]. The committee in this way reasserted the position of the
profession with respect to fraud detection and maintained that the audit
purposes as previously articulated were sound. The problem confronting
the profession was thus seen as one of educating the public about the
proper role of the auditor rather than a reconsideration of this role.
Audits were not designed to detect fraud, and the public was to accept
the profession's definitions of its roles and responsibilities.
This emphasis upon interpreting public criticisms as the public's
failure to understand the auditor's role can also be seen in the 1974
formation of the Cohen Commission on auditor's responsibilities.8 This
commission was charged with "determining] whether a gap exists
between what the public expects of auditors and what auditors can
reasonably be expected to accomplish [News Report, Journal of
Accountancy, 1974, p. 14]. The wording of this announcement
suggested the results the AICPA anticipated the Commission would find:
the public's expectations of auditors were unreasonable and auditors had
appropriately defined their tasks. As part of its efforts at impression
management, the AICPA later pointed to the formation of the Cohen

8

The Commission was to explore mechanisms for developing auditing
standards, possible alterations to the standard audit report, and whether
auditors
should 1997
monitor all financial information released to the public. 11
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Commission as evidence that it was taking the steps necessary to police
itself: "We're going to show that accountants are concerned about the
consumer" [New York Times, May 9, 1976]. Apparently, the formation
of the Commission rather than any changes resulting from its possible
recommendations was to be seen as sufficient evidence of auditor
concerns about discrepancies between public and auditor interpretations
of how to define auditor tasks and responsibilities.
Emphasizing Better Communication. Again, criticisms of auditors
were interpreted as the public's failure to understand properly the role of
the auditor. However, this failure was now explicitly attributed to faulty
communications between the auditor and the public. At times, this faulty
communication was blamed upon the media for misleading the public:
and if the public has cast the accountant in the role of the
nemesis of all those who would embezzle funds, falsify financial
statements or commit other corporate crimes, it is not altogether
at fault. Some of the recent publicity in connection with
lawsuits involving prominent accounting firms appears to lend
considerable credence to the idea that the auditor is, in the final
analysis, the conscience of business, big and small. In reality,
this is a popular misconception [Silverman, 1971, p. 80].
At other times, faulty communication was attributed to the existing audit
opinion. In 1969, Roth [p. 61] argued that
A better understanding of the independent auditor's role by the
users of our reports and by the public generally might go far
toward reducing the number of cases taken to court and
resultant unfortunate legal decisions. One means of attaining
better understanding could possibly be a clearer explanation of
the scope and purpose of our audit in our short-form report.
Rosenfield and Lorenson [1974] also blamed the ambiguous audit report
for the turmoil over auditor responsibilities. In particular, they faulted
the statement made within this standard report that claimed financial
statements were presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. They recognized that this statement could be
subject to a number of different interpretations, each of which implied
differing responsibilities for auditors.
The failure of the public to understand was in part a consequence of
poor communication by auditors. As such, the solution to then current
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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controversies surrounding the audit profession was to consider
"improving" the audit report so as to describe better the profession's
conception of an audit's purpose. However, this purpose was still to be
defined by the profession. Apparently, "improved communication" was
to be a monologue in which the public would be told by the profession
what it could "reasonably" expect from an audit. In calling for altered
audit reports, there was a presumption that the existing practices, roles,
and responsibilities of auditors were appropriate. The public was to
accept that the audit profession knew best how to enhance the credibility
of financial information.
Calling Upon Other Cultural Values. Other authors attempted to
justify more directly the position of the profession with respect to the
discovery of fraud. They attempted to convince the public (or perhaps
only Congress and the SEC) that its interpretations of the role of an audit
were unreasonable and inappropriate. Some pointed to the confusion
regarding the definition of fraud and noted that many business failures
arose from other factors such as bad management or adverse economic
conditions [Catlett, 1975]. They also argued that requiring auditors to
accept responsibility for fraud detection would interfere with American
cultural values of "free" enterprise and "opportunity for all" [Catlett,
1975; Cooney, 1995]. By imposing such requirements on auditors, they
would be reluctant to accept more risky companies as clients. As a
result, these companies (often start-ups) would be unable to obtain audit
services and would thereby be effectively denied access to capital
markets. Following this chain of reasoning, free enterprise, and
consequently competition within industries, would be hampered if
auditors were required to accept fraud detection as one of their
responsibilities. Stated in other words, the "traditional" responsibilities
of auditors as currently defined served to promote greater economic
opportunities for all.9
It was also argued that requiring auditors to accept this

9

Interestingly, some individuals attempted to employ the weight of
"tradition" as a reason to maintain the status quo. They claimed that fraud
detection conflicted with the "traditional" audit approach and was, in general,
too costly an undertaking [e.g., New York Times, April 6, 1975]. However,
these arguments represented an effort to construct such a tradition. The
Cohen Commission later traced the steady erosion of fraud detection as an
audit objective [AICPA, 1978, pp. 33-35]. See Hobsbawn and Ranger [1984]
on the construction of traditions.
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responsibility would sacrifice another cultural value—efficiency [Abbott,
1988]. Relative to the large number of audits conducted each year, the
incidence of undetected fraud (an audit failure as defined by the public)
was claimed to be small (a claim perhaps impossible to either refute or
substantiate). Requiring auditors to search actively for fraud would
result in the performance of additional audit procedures. But if one
assumed that undetected fraud was a relatively infrequent event, then
obviously such additional efforts would not be cost-effective [Hershman,
1974], but rather a waste of auditor time and client money.10
Outlining Expertise and Its Limits. Again, auditors maintained
that the public failed to understand the particular expertise of auditors.
Some expressed the opinion that an adequate answer to the question of
what "good" is an audit that could not provide assurance that material
fraud was detected "is exceedingly involved and probably beyond the
grasp of the average user of the auditor's work" [Carmichael, 1979], the
"non-expert." Others questioned the ability of such non-experts to
understand the "esoteric, highly specialized professional standards and
responsibilities" of the auditor [Solomon et al., 1976]. In effect, because
the public was not expert in auditing, the nature and extent of the
complex tasks underpinning the audit report were best left to those
specifically trained in undertaking these tasks. In making these
arguments, Solomon et al. [1976] criticized the actions of the trial judge
in the Continental Vending case who had instructed the jury that "proof
of compliance with GAAP [generally accepted accounting principles] is
evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive
that [the auditor] acted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were
not materially false or misleading." The judge's instructions were to be
seen as inappropriate because the professional expertise and judgment
of the audit profession was being effectively supplanted by that of a less
informed and knowledgeable jury. Instead, for these authors, the jury
should have been instructed that compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles would be sufficient to acquit the auditors. In
forwarding these arguments, the authors suggested that the audit should
be considered an end in itself and that the means to this end were best left
to the experts, the audit profession. In deciding whether an audit had
resulted in the production of reliable financial reports, one need look no
further than assessing whether the statements were prepared in
accordance with the established accounting rules and auditing standards.

10

This argument echoes that made by Montgomery [1940] to explain why
fraud
detection was not an audit purpose.
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Even as some maintained that the expertise of auditors lay beyond
the understanding of the general public, others argued that this expertise
also had its limits. Now, auditors were argued to possess no special
powers in detecting fraud. They were not favored with hindsight and
conducted audits under a presumption of honest management [New York
Times, April 6, 1975]. As such, the audit profession could not and
should not undertake responsibilities it could not successfully fulfill
[Catlett, 1975].11 Such justifications for the status quo presumed a
certain fixity in the nature of an audit engagement and a self-assurance
as regards its continuing relevance in the face of efforts to exclude
nonauditors from any role in defining its nature and purpose. These
justifications also suggested an extraordinary confidence in the
continuing importance of the audit profession and its self-defined tasks.
In issuing revised auditing standards on fraud and illegal acts in the
late 1970s, the profession attempted to maintain the status quo. The
fraud standard repeated previous professional statements about the
limitations of the existing audit process, limitations that might allow
errors to remain undetected. As such, it was seen to do little more than
to reiterate "traditional" audit doctrine and to emphasize that frauds do
occur [Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1976] and might remain undetected.
Similarly, the proposal on illegal acts explicitly recognized the expertise
limitations of auditors and indicated that auditors could not be expected
to provide legal opinions. Again, this new requirement was seen to have
little effect upon existing auditor responsibilities [Wall Street Journal,
January 31, 1977].
The articles appearing in the accounting practitioner journals and
elsewhere during this period seemed to emphasize the necessity for
making the public understand the auditor's roles and responsibilities as
interpreted by auditors. This understanding was to be imposed upon the
public by the profession. Although auditors claimed to act in the public
interest, they also maintained that as "experts" they were best qualified
to decide their responsibilities. They argued that the profession was best
situated to decide what constituted reasonable public expectations with

11

This lack of expertise/professional competence argument was also used
to justify resistance to placing upon auditors a responsibility for the detection
of illegal payments [New York Times, September 28, 1976]. Many illegal acts
were seen as far removed from entity's financial affairs (the area of audit
expertise). As such, it was unlikely that an auditor could detect them during
the audit engagement (e.g., violations of OSHA or EPA regulations) [Solomon
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regards to audit performance and auditor roles and responsibilities.
Auditors were to define these tasks both for themselves and the public;
they were to control the activities within their professional jurisdiction
and to decide whether the credibility of financial statements was being
enhanced by their activities.
CHANGING THE TERMS OF DEBATE
In 1976, a highly critical Senate staff study was released about the
accounting profession [U.S. Senate, 1976]. This study claimed that the
professional interests of auditors were too closely intertwined with those
of large corporate clients, attacked auditor claims of independence and
questioned the reliability of private audits [New York Times, January 23,
1977]. In a cover letter, Senator Metcalf stated that the Big Eight
accounting firms had shown "an alarming lack of independence and lack
of dedication to public protection" [New York Times, January 17, 1977].
The study suggested that governmental regulation of auditors might be
necessary, including the establishment of federal auditing standards
[Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977]. It also questioned the
appropriateness of the existing process for establishing accounting
standards [U.S. Senate, 1976]. Initially, the AICPA expressed dismay
at the Senate staff's
unwarranted conclusions. This effort [of the AICPA over 35
years] combined with actions of SEC results in achieving the
highest quality of financial reporting and disclosure of any
country in the world [Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977].
Partners from Big Eightfirmswere reported as describing the staff study
as both wrong and superficial [New York Times, January 17, 1977].
Despite these assertions, several auditors who later testified during the
Congressional hearings about the study urged Congress to allow the
auditing profession time to reform itself.
With the publication of this report and the convening of subsequent
Congressional hearings, attention appeared to shift away from questions
about the appropriate roles and responsibilities of auditors and towards
an emphasis upon finding specific practices that could serve as symbols
suggestive of the appearance of auditor independence. The threat of an
increased federal role in the operations of the auditing profession appears
to have been a critical element in this shift. The "new" practices
installed during this period included the formation of audit committees,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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disclosures of disagreements between auditors and corporate clients, and
the implementation of mechanisms to discipline and control the actions
of auditors, such as peer review. In emphasizing the development and
implementation of these practices, questions that had earlier been raised
about the proper roles and responsibilities of auditors faded into the
background. This shift was quite significant in that it allowed the
auditing profession to continue forwarding its preferred meanings for an
audit and its definitions of the appropriate roles and responsibilities for
auditors.
With this shift, attention was redirected from the
interpretations to be accorded an audit to focus instead upon the sorts of
services an audit firm could be permitted to provide and still claim its
independence from clients and the types of disciplinary techniques
needed to convince nonauditors that professional self-regulation was
possible and workable.12
This shift from a consideration of roles and responsibilities to
finding and installing specific practices of self-regulation occurred in
spite of the publication of the tentative and final conclusions of the
Cohen Commission. In its tentative conclusions, this Commission
suggested that the expectations gap often described by auditors as
unreasonable was apparently ". . . caused by the failure of auditors to
fully assume responsibilities they are capable of assuming, rather than
by unreasonable user expectations" [Seidler, 1977, p. 20]. The Cohen
Commission recommended that auditors be required to provide a broader
range of information about corporate clients and to expose publicly the
wrongdoing of clients in certain circumstances. It further recommended
that the auditors clarify their responsibility for fraud detection. In
making this recommendation, the Commission commented that the users
of financial statements "should have the right to assume that audited
financial information is not unreliable because of fraud and that
management maintains appropriate controls to safeguard assets"
[AICPA, 1977, p. 36]. In other words, credible financial reporting could
not be produced if auditors failed to detect material fraud.
These recommendations suggested that public interpretations of the
significance of the audit and auditors' responsibilities of should
supersede some definitions forwarded by the profession. While the
profession was to decide how these different tasks would be
implemented, the Commission explicitly accepted a role for the "public"
in defining the responsibilities of auditors.
In this way, its
recommendations might have been seen to threaten the dominant role of
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the profession in defining its own roles and responsibilities.
Unsurprisingly, its recommendations tended to be ignored by the
AICPA.13
INTEREST RENEWED
As the 1980s began, Congressional interest in accounting and
auditing matters subsided. In 1981, the New York Times commented:
Pressure for Federal regulation has waned. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has shredded its letters warning of the
importance of auditor independence from the companies they
audit.
And, perhaps most surprising, certified public
accountants now occupy powerful positions in Washington
[New York Times, October 7, 1981].
In this same article, an AICPA representative was quoted:
For the first time in years, the accounting profession is
experiencing real power in Washington not just outside
influence.
Even as regulatory interest in accounting waned, articles continued to
appear in the press (although with less frequency than earlier) that were
critical of auditing and accounting. The media continued to report on the
ways in which "slick" accounting ploys were used to improve the
reported income of companies [Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1980], on
the rise of accounting "scams" accepted by auditors without qualification
[Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1982], about SEC charges that financial
statement "fudging" was a growing practice [Wall Street Journal, June
2, 1983; "The SEC Turns Up the Heat," Business Week, 1984] and on
the increasing number of corporations that fired auditors who had issued

13

Indeed, the AICPA was accused of responding superficially to these
recommendations by studying the report intensively in small committees
while failing to heed its advice [Seidler, 1979]. For example, the AICPA
announced the formation of a committee to study the tentative conclusions of
the Cohen Commission in 1977. This announcement also suggested the
importance of the Commission for public relations purposes: "This is the type
of independent study that would benefit any profession which is accountable
to the public" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1977, pp. 16, 18].
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qualified audit opinions [Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1983].
As the prohibitions on advertising and client solicitation were either
dropped or substantially reduced, competition within the auditing
industry (often taking the form of price competition) increased
dramatically and auditing firms entered into the "alien world of
marketing" [Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1981]. Accounting firms
were now characterized as ever more aggressively "courting competitors'
clients, promising lower audit fees" [New York Times, October 3, 1984]
and squeezing profit margins on the traditional auditing business of the
large accounting firms [New York Times, December 30, 1984]. In this
environment, concerns were raised about "whether growing competitive
pressures [might] be encouraging auditors to bend the rules in favor of
clients, such as keeping a questionable loan on the books to keep up the
bank's profits on paper" [New York Times, March, 10, 1985]. Questions
were also raised as to whether audits had become "loss leaders used
merely to win more profitable management and tax-consulting contracts
with the client" [New York Times, February 18, 1985]. These questions
suggested that auditors were failing to carry out the roles and
responsibilities which they had defined for themselves. They implied or
stated outright that auditors and audits were not enhancing the credibility
of financial statements in at least some instances.
Such questions arose amidst a number of significant "audit failures"
occurring relatively soon after an entity had received an unqualified audit
opinion ["Auditing the Auditors," Business Week, 1983]. In 1982, Penn
Square Bank collapsed three and one-half months after receiving an
unqualified audit opinion [Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1982].
Although the auditors had warned Penn Square directors that the bank's
financial problems were growing, they issued an unqualified audit
opinion because of perceived risks to depositor confidence [Wall Street
Journal, August 17, 1982]. Similarly, three weeks before the FDIC
declared United American Bank insolvent, its audit firm issued an
unqualified audit opinion on the bank's financial statements even though
many federal investigators had been present during the audit [Wall Street
Journal, March 4, 1983]. In 1984, the New York Times listed several
instances of alleged audit failures including Litton Industries, Security
America Corporation, Drysdale Government Securities Corporation,
Saxon Industries, Flight Transportation, Alpex Computer, United
American Bank, Penn Square Bank, and Datapoint [New York Times,
May 13, 1984]. Later, the New York Times [November 23, 1984]
reported several lawsuits pending against a single international
accounting firm arising from audit work at DeLorean Motor Company,
Published by eGrove, 1997
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Nucorp Energy, Seafirst National Bank, Frigitemp, the Reserve
Insurance Co., and the Financial Corporation of America. Between 1980
and early 1985, the largest accountingfirmspaid more than $ 175 million
in settlements and judgments over disputed audits [McComas, 1986].
Despite earlier efforts to convince the public that the profession had
no responsibility to detect fraud, the significant number of instances
designated as "audit failures" again raised questions regarding the
significances that could be accorded to an unqualified or "clean" audit
opinion. For example, the New York Times [May 13, 1984] commented
that auditors are thought of as
the watchdogs who will detect fraud or emerging financial
problems before those problems sink a bank or make a
corporation's stock price plunge.
But such faith has been eroded lately through a series of
incidents in which some of the most elite accounting firms have
blessed a financial statements on the eve of disaster.
Were auditors fulfilling this responsibility? Did the audit enhance the
credibility of financial reports?
In 1985, Congressional attention again focused upon the auditing
profession and hearings were held about the role of auditors. Before
these hearings began, Rep. Dingell, the Committee chair, indicated his
concerns about "whether accounting is giving us a fair and accurate and
truthful picture of what is going on in the industry" [New York Times,
February 18, 1985]. His committee intended to raise questions regarding
whether competitive pressures and MAS services were eroding the
independence of auditors [New York Times, February 18, 1985] and why
auditors had not provided advance warning of the deteriorating financial
condition of banks and other companies [Wall Street Journal, February
12, 1985; February 19, 1985].
In opening the hearings, Dingell referred to a U.S. Supreme Court
description of the auditor's role:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes
a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client....This public watchdog function
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from
the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public
trust [quoted in Miller, 1986, pp. 28-29].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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The media also reported charges by the Dingell committee that the
existing regulatory framework had not been effective in
providing a warning system that might have prevented a series
of financial disasters in the last few years—including the run on
Continental Illinois National Bank, and the collapse of Penn
Square Bank and Drysdale Government Securities. In each
case, auditors gave the company's financial statements a clean
opinion shortly before disaster struck [New York Times, March
7, 1985].14
Given these concerns, the Dingell committee investigated the role of
accounting firms in "blessing" those accounting practices that were
perceived to mask the financial condition of several savings and loan
entities that later failed. Comments in the press indicated that the
committee believed self-regulation was flawed: ". . . the same people
write the (financial accounting) rules, interpret the rules . . . [sic] and
enforce the rules" [Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1985]. Dingell
commented:
The present self-regulatory system permits the accounting firms
to control the setting of audit standards, to apply those
standards to individual clients, and to sit in judgment of
themselves when an audit failure occurs. All of this is done in
private [quoted in Miller, 1986, p. 32].
The many alleged audit failures raised renewed concerns about the
independence and objectivity of auditors in the high-pressure competitive
environment in which accounting firms also offered consulting services
[Dingell, 1985; Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1985]. During the
hearings, Dingell highlighted these concerns by referring to a newspaper
advertisement that ended by saying "In fact, there's only one thing wrong
with calling ourselves Deloitte Haskins & Sells & You. The You really
should come first."
He commented: "That doesn't sound too
independent to me" [New York Times, March 10, 1985]. The terms
employed in the previous paragraphs to describe the perceived problems
with auditing are quite telling—a public watchdog function, an early
warning system, "inappropriate" clean bills of health, "blessing" of
misleading financial accounting practices, and concerns about the

14
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"independence" of auditors. Admittedly, some of these terms might be
seen as high-flown rhetoric by a Congressional committee desiring the
public attention it could receive by focusing upon the perceived failures
of auditors. However, by asking whether the public watchdog function
of auditors was impaired, the committee suggested that auditors should
serve this function. In suggesting that auditors had failed to provide
advance warning of imminent corporate failures, the Committee implied
that auditors had this responsibility. Further, in saying that auditors had
"blessed" misleading accounting practices, the Committee claimed that
auditors had failed to carry out the roles and responsibilities which the
profession had defined for itself. The committee's allegations were thus
doubly damning—not only had auditors failed to define their tasks
properly but they had also failed to perform the work which they
themselves had defined as appropriate.
The Dingell hearings challenged the definitions of roles and
responsibilities advanced by the profession. These hearings suggested
that the issuance of an audit report implied broader responsibilities than
those previously accepted and advocated by auditors. During the 1970s,
auditors had maintained that audits were not specifically designed to
detect fraud. Now, they were again criticized for failing to detect fraud
and also for failing to provide an "early warning" of possible corporate
failures. The media, in its coverage of the Dingell committee hearings
and elsewhere, appeared to define an audit failure as the issuance of a
"clean" audit report shortly followed by the declaration of corporate
bankruptcy or the incidence of financial problems [Wall Street Journal,
February 21, 1985; March 7, 1985]. This definition contained no
reference to GAAS and implied that an audit failure could occur even
when an auditor had followed such practices, a definition that conflicted
with that provided by the auditors.
Auditor Response. The auditors responded by attempting to defend
their own definitions of the roles and purposes of an audit and to deny
that the existing system was "broken." In testimony before the Dingell
Committee, Philip Chenok, AICPA president, indicated that the
incidence of audit failures was quite small relative to the large number
of audits performed, claiming that of 50,000 audits performed since
1979 only 123 might be called "audit failures" [Wall Street Journal,
February 19, 1985]. In a later editorial, Chenok again stressed the
relative infrequency of audit failures noting that "audit failures can and
do occur but they are rare in relation to the tens of thousands of audits
conducted each year. They result from human error by individual
auditors. They do not reflect the overall quality of work in the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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profession" [New York Times, March 17, 1985]. The small number of
acknowledged audit failures was used to suggest that the current system
was operating properly.
The audit profession and others again argued that nonauditors had
failed to understand the "proper" role of the auditor and the signficances
that could be appropriately assigned to audit opinions. For example,
Chenok [1986] noted that the Dingell hearings were concerned with
whether auditors had effectively discharged their duties. He maintained
that in order to answer this question one must understand the function of
the independent audit—it was to report on the fairness with which
financial statements presented corporate financial position [Chenok,
1986]. The audit profession was to be judged on its own terms.
As in the 1970s, auditors maintained that criticisms of the profession
resultedfromthe public's failure to understand the "appropriate" role of
the auditor and to accept the definition of this role as forwarded by
auditors. From this perspective, an unqualified audit opinion was to be
seen as providing reasonable assurance that financial statements
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles rather than as
providing evidence of a "clean bill of health." As such, an unqualified
opinion might be appropriate for a company on the brink of financial
collapse as long as the financial statements "reflect[ed] a fair and
accurate picture of the company'sfinancialcondition" [New York Times,
March 10, 1985].15 Furthermore, audits were not foolproof as the audit
process relied upon a small sample of company transactions, many
accounting matters were open to judgment [New York Times, March 10,
1985; Chenok, 1986] and fraud was difficult to detect [Chenok, 1986].
Perhaps the following quote best summarizes the audit profession's
position with regard to the controversy surrounding its work:
A number of the questions raised in your proceedings [the
Dingell Committee] and in our own studies of these matters are
provoked by even more fundamental questions concerning
auditor performance. These questions involve not how well the

15

However, if an entity was seen to be on the brink of collapse, the going
concern assumption would be invalid and the use of historical cost accounting
inappropriate according to generally accepted accounting principles. One
wonders how manyfinancialstatements of companies that failed shortly after
receiving an unqualified audit opinion were prepared using a basis of
accounting
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auditor has performed, but whether the auditor must undertake
additional responsibilities to satisfy society's needs. Repeatedly
it has been asserted that the public is seeking more from
auditors in the area of protection from fraud and early warnings
of business failure. In these respects, it would seem that there
exists a gap between public expectations of the auditor's role
and that which the auditor is, in fact, today performing. It is
our belief that skepticism about the work of independent
auditors has more to do with this mismatch. . . than it does with
actual performance failures [cited in Miller, 1986, p. 34].
Again, the profession attempted to reframe concerns about its work as
evidence of rising public expectations rather than as a controversy over
the meanings to be assigned to audit reports and audit work and who
would decide such meanings. Although concerns about the responsibility
of auditors to detect fraud had arisen previously, the profession had not
substantially altered its conception of its responsibilities or accepted an
explicit responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate
collapses. It was still attempting to dominate definitions of its roles and
responsibilities and to resist those forwarded by the Dingell committee
and the press. Again, it formed a committee amidst the controversy.
This committee was to "look at the current responsibilities of
management, the auditors within and outside the company to detect
fraud" [Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985] and to develop methods
to prevent and detect fraud among public and closely held companies
[Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1985].16 The framing of the issue to
be investigated by this panel suggested the answer desired by the
AICPA. In particular, note the ordering of the individuals whose
responsibilities were to be investigated: managers followed by internal
auditors followed by external auditors. This ordering might be
interpreted to reflect the profession's interest in maintaining that the
detection of fraud was primarily management's responsibility.
Congressional Intervention? Despite the arguments of the audit
profession and SEC and the tentative actions taken by the audit
profession, several Congresspersons introduced legislation to require

16

In announcing the formation of the panel, the AICPA denied that its
formation was linked to the Dingell hearings that were due to begin on
February 20, 1985: "We have been considering suggesting formation of this
panel since last September, and we aren't doing this in reaction to the
hearings" [Chenok in Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985].
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auditors to report to Government authorities suspicions of fraud or other
illegalities noted during an audit [New York Times, May 23, 1986]. Rep.
Wyden, a bill sponsor, indicated that "We've got to have an early
warning system out there" [New York Times, May 23, 1986].17 Despite
criticisms, the audit profession was still seen as a means to enhance the
credibility of financial reporting. The bill did not propose replacing
auditors with other experts. Instead, the responsibilities of the profession
would be altered and expanded by this legislative action. The bill was
of course, opposed by accounting firms as well as by the SEC and
certain trade groups [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986].
In justifying this opposition, certain members of the profession
expressed concerns that by requiring auditors to "blow the whistle" the
relationship between the auditor and the client would be fundamentally
altered [e.g., Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1986], "put[ting] us into an
adversarial police-like role with corporations we currently service, and
no one would benefit" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Auditors
would become nothing more than "state-regulated examiners" when
auditing "should be a private-sector activity, not an extension of the
government's role" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Changing the
role of independent auditors "to a police role" would detract from the
primary responsibility of auditors—that of providing opinions as to
whether corporate financial statements accurately reflect the "true"
financial condition of a company [New York Times, May 23, 1986].
This proposed role for auditors would be "unworkable in relation to
the auditor's principal objective of assessing the fair presentation of
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles . . ." [Miller, 1986]. The bill was seen as "unworkable" in
part because it conflicted with the auditing profession's definition of its
own roles and responsibilities. From its perspective, auditors were to
assess whether financial statements fairly presented financial condition
and performance, a task that did not require them to search actively for
fraud even if it might result in material misstatements of financial
condition and performance. These comments suggest the reluctance of
auditors to alter their conception of their roles and responsibilities and
a desire to dominate the definitions of tasks and responsibilities within
their jurisdiction.
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Wyden later introduced a watered down version of the bill to require
auditors to inform management about significant fraud and then to notify the
SEC only if management failed to act properly upon such information within
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Other prominent members of the auditing profession began to
advocate altering professional responsibilities to include a responsibility
for fraud detection. Change was seen as necessary in light of public
expectations that auditors and the financial reporting system would warn
the public of impending failures [Bertholdt, 1986]. Although the
auditing profession was not described as failing to meet its public
responsibilities, some believed it could no longer ignore the concerns
raised by Congress, courts and the public. The expectations of the
public were described as changed and so the roles and responsibilities of
auditors and financial reporting should also ". . . be amended to provide
the 'predictive' value the public now demands" [Connor, 1986, p. 77].
Perhaps, in these changed circumstances, auditors should accept
responsibility to search for conditions that might lead to materially
misstated financial statements and to reduce the risk that fraud would
remain undetected [also see editorial by Connor in Wall Street Journal,
December 3, 1985].
A limited role for the public in defining auditor's roles and
responsibilities was also implied by the Treadway Commission report
which recommended amending the auditor's opinion to indicate that
auditors could provide reasonable but not absolute assurance that
financial statements were free of fraud [New York Times, July 13,
1987].18 This role was further recognized with the issuance of several
new auditing standards in 1988 that were intended to improve auditor
performance and communications, to address the concerns raised by the
Treadway Commission report, and to narrow the expectations gap.
Among other requirements, these standards enjoined auditors to be alert
for illegal activities during the conduct of an audit, to design audit work
to provide reasonable assurance of detecting material irregularities and
errors, and to inform the board of directors of any such findings.19 These
18

This report also recommended that all public companies be required to
have audit committees and that auditors be evaluated by their peers. However,
the report contained little evidence that audit committees, peer reviews, or an
altered audit opinion would educe the incidence of fraudulent financial
reporting. Indeed, pTL which was embroiled in financial scandal had an audit
committee. However, the committee was composed of individuals with little
experience, and they served primarily to rubber stamp the fraudulent activity
of pTL officers such as Jim Bakker [Tidwell, 1993].
19

Rep. Wyden criticized the new standards on the detection of fraud as he
believed auditors needed to report suspicions of fraud to regulators ] Wall
Street Journal, February 10, 1988].
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standards implied that, in designing audits, auditors could no longer
presume that management was honest and expressed more affirmatively
the responsibilities of auditors relative to fraud [Carmichael, 1988]. The
audit report was also revised in an effort to articulate more clearly the
responsibilities of auditors to detect errors and irregularities. In
particular, the following sentence was added to the report: "Those
standards [GAAS] require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatements" [Roussey, et al., 1988, p. 45, emphasis added].
The new audit standards also required auditors to evaluate whether there
was substantial doubt about a company's ability to continue as a "going
concern" and to disclose such doubts.20
Reactions to these standards by auditors included criticisms of the
lack of clarity in detailing the extent of the auditor's responsibility to
detect fraud [Neebes & Roost, 1987]. Others continued to advocate the
"right" of the profession to define its own tasks and responsibilities. For
example, Elliott and Jacobson [1987, p. 18] asked:
Should CPAs judge proposed standards primarily by whether
they do or do not conform to public expectations...A
professional either has expertise and integrity that separates him
[sic]fromthe public or he [sic] does not. . . That does not mean
that public expectations are unimportant, only that they should
not be the basic criterion used to evaluate proposed auditing
standards. The appropriate criterion is whether and to what
degree a proposal would improve the effectiveness of audits of
financial statements. This responds to the public need the
profession serves, not to supposed expectations. And needs and
expectations can differ. (Emphasis in original)
Although Elliot and Jacobson raised some valid criticisms of the
proposed expectation gap standards in the remainder of their article, their
basic opposition to the new accounting standards was premised upon
disagreement over who should define the roles and responsibilities of
auditors. For these authors, auditors should decide the nature and
content of the tasks within their professional jurisdiction. In turn, the

20
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public must rely upon (and trust) auditors to assess public needs rather
than capitulate to unwarranted public expectations. Yet, the authors did
not explicate how one could distinguish between a need and an
expectation nor did they suggest any measure by which to evaluate the
effectiveness of audits. Instead, they presumed that audits were essential
to the economy and were capable of addressing the warranted concerns
of the public by continuing on those terms previously established by
auditors. In other words, the lay public was to have little role in defining
this work or its expected outcomes.
In contrast to the events of the 1970s, critical attention was not
deflected from the auditing profession. As the media reported on new
corporate failures, questions about the usefulness of audit opinions, and,
in particular, questions regarding how financial results could turn sour
so quickly after the issuance of a "clean" audit report continued to be
raised. Alleged audit failures included Regina Co., Allegheny
International Inc., Crazy Eddie Inc., Coated Sales Inc., and American
Biomaterials Corp. [Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1989]. The ZZZZ
Best Co. collapse was thought to provide the ". . . most vivid proof that
the present system for independent auditors reporting financial fraud" did
not work [Dingell in Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1988]. This
collapse was particularly troubling as ZZZZ Best had fired one audit
firm and hired another shortly before its financial collapse. Although the
first audit firm communicated its suspicions of financial misdeeds to the
SEC within the allotted time (30 days), this communication occurred
after ZZZZ Best had filed for bankruptcy protection {Wall Street
Journal, January 22, 1988; New York Times, January 27, 1988].
The audit profession was also heavily criticized in the press and by
Congress, the General Accounting Office and others for its perceived
failure to warn the public of the impending savings and loan crisis, a
warning some claimed might have reduced the costs arising from the
savings and loan bailout [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, November 23,
1987; Jacob, 1991; Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6,"Business Week, 1992].
The quality of audits was criticized in almost every major savings and
loan failure.21 For example, after the failure of Lincoln Savings and
Loan, one regulator commented: "Lincoln is proof positive that any
thrift in America could obtain a clean audit opinion despite being grossly
insolvent" [Wall Street Journal, November 21, 1989] and allegations

21

Indeed, a GAO report [1989] alleged that auditors had in some instances
failed to verify independently management assertions about the collectibility
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were also made that Lincoln's auditors had approved transactions that
were "accounting-driven" in order to generate profits [Wall Street
Journal, August 7, 1989; November 15, 1989]. Congress held many
hearings to investigate these savings and loan failures, at which auditors
were frequent witnesses. Audit firms were confronted with numerous
lawsuits and paid significant settlements and fines in the aftermath of the
savings and loan crisis [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, December 30,
1988; January 24, 1989; January 27, 1989; March 2, 1990; February 6,
1991; June 14, 1991; July 5, 1991; December 6, 1992].
In the midst of this controversy and scrutiny, Rep. Wyden continued
to advocate legislation to require auditors to report to regulators the
uncorrected illegal acts of audit clients and to promote legislation
designed to establish an early warning system to prevent future financial
debacles such as that which had occurred in the savings and loan
industry [Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1990, October 5, 1990, August
2, 1991; September 3, 1991; July 29, 1992]. Various versions of this
bill continued to be opposed by assorted business groups receiving on
again but mostly off again support from the AICPA. This continued
opposition occurred within the context of a self-described audit "liability
crisis". Audit firms were reported to have expended hundreds of millions
of dollars in fines, legal fees and settlements in the wake of the savings
and loan crisis and as a consequence of securities fraud class action suits
filed after a fluctuation in stock prices. One 1992 commentary estimated
that accounting firms faced 4,000 liability suits (twice the number in
1985) and that the largest firms were spending $30 million each year in
legal fees [McCarroll, 1992]. Indeed, lawsuits resulted in the
bankruptcy of one major U.S. auditing firm in 1990.
Legal liability exposure was now described as the profession's top
concern [see e.g., Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6", Business Week, 1992;
O'Malley, 1993a,b; Lochner, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Fogarty et al., 1994]
and it portrayed itself as a scapegoat for bureaucratic errors and investor
desires to avoid losses ["Big 6", Business Week, 1992; O'Malley,
1993a]. Members of the profession sought liability reform as litigation
was increasing ". . . at a rapid rate . . . but that would not be so bad if
only incompetent or dishonest auditors were penalized by huge
judgments. However, few intelligent observers believe that this is the
case" [Lochner, 1993, p. 94], as "unwarranted litigation and forced
settlements constitute the vast majority of claims against accountants"
[O'Malley, 1993b, p. 84]. In 1992, the Big 6 accounting firms joined a
coalition of professional organizations and business, the Coalition to
Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits, to lobby in favor of federal
Published by eGrove, 1997
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legislation to curb "abusive lawsuits alleging securities fraud" [Wall
Street Journal, September 1, 1992].
This rising incidence of litigation against auditors was interpreted as
a search by the public for absolute assurance and as a threat to the
ability of the financial reporting system to provide relevant, reliable and
credible information. From this perspective, the audit opinion was to be
interpreted neither as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval"
[McCarroll, 1992; Jacob, 1991] nor as suggesting that a particular
company was a worthwhile or safe investment. Public expectations for
audits were characterized as spiralling ever upward with regards to their
ability to prevent fraud, mismanagement and business failure. Lochner
[1993, p. 94] argued that "Far too much weight is being placed on
accountants' work, in part because even some businessmen [sic] are
ignorant of how audits are performed and what they represent. . . . audits
cannot guarantee accuracy or the detection of fraud; they are not
insurance policies."
In this environment, auditors expressed concern as to whether
legislation such as that proposed by Rep. Wyden would open the door
for additional lawsuits against auditors—now by their clients
[Silverstein, 1992; O'Malley, 1993a]. Further, some members of the
profession began to characterize the necessity for liability reform as
inseparable from auditors agreeing to undertake additional
responsibilities [e.g., O'Malley, 1993a,b; Epstein, 1993]. This
connection was made most explicitly by O'Malley [1993b, p.85] who
argued that "any effort on the profession's part to meet these [public]
expectations . . . always seems to generate newer and even more
unrealistic expectations. . ." [O'Malley, 1993b, p. 85]. He also stated
point-blank that "the accounting profession will not support any further
legislative expansion of the independent auditor's responsibility without
meaningful liability reform—for it is our view that increased obligations
that create unreasonable expectations will almost certainly produce
increased litigation" [O'Malley, 1993a, p. 7]. In other words, further
participation by the public in defining the roles and responsibilities of
auditors would carry a price—tort reform.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
With the passage of the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995" [Public Law 104-67], the legal liability concerns of auditors
were addressed. This new legislation enacted a system of proportionate
liability under which auditors will pay damages based upon the share of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/3
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fraud for which they are held responsible. In exchange for this
protection,22 the new law explicitly requires auditors to include
"procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal
acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of
financial statement amounts", "procedures designed to identity related
party transactions . . . or otherwise require disclosure. . ." and "an
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the
issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year"
[Public Law 104-67]. Furthermore, the law places a responsibility upon
auditors to provide the SEC with a copy of their report of any illegal acts
which have a material effect upon the financial statements when
management fails to take "timely and appropriate remedial actions" and
the Board of Directors has failed to inform the SEC of such a report
within one business day after its receipt from the auditors [Public Law
104-67]. Auditors, in exchange for liability reform, have accepted an
affirmative duty to notify regulators of illegal acts in prescribed
circumstances. Auditors must still implement the requirements of this
legislation and the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA has issued
a proposal providing additional performance requirements to enable
auditors to meet their fraud-detection responsibility [Wall Street
Journal, April 4, 1996].
After decades of vociferous opposition to accepting responsibilities
to detect fraud, such a responsibility has now been enacted into law.
Throughout much of the period examined in this paper (and before),
auditors sought to dominate the definitions of their roles and
responsibilities and to equate the conduct of an audit with the production
of credible financial reporting. Auditors were no doubt correct in
asserting that an audit could not always be depended upon to detect
frauds nor to warn infallibly of imminent business failures. However, in
defining their roles and responsibilities, they argued that neither of these
responsibilities were elements of their tasks (at least prior to the issuance
of certain auditing standards in 1988). In part, the failure of auditors to
"educate" the public as to the value of an audit that excluded such tasks
from their jurisdictional domain arose from cultural values with which
audits were aligned. The public refused to accept that despite credible
financial reporting significant fraud could remained undetected and
corporations could fail soon after a "clean" audit report was issued.

22
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Auditors had perhaps little choice in terms of the cultural values
with which to align their work. While the profession benefited greatly
from the Securities Acts, growing rapidly after their passage [McCraw,
1984], it was in another sense limited by these acts. This New Deal
legislation did not fundamentally alter either the securities industry or
public policy with respect to it. Instead, the legislation seemed designed
to restore confidence in the industry and to encourage broad-based stock
ownership. The legislation adhered to the "belief that shareholders are
'owners'" who could participate effectively in corporate governance
through disclosure and proxy provisions [Merino & Neimark, 1982, p.
39]23 Although shareholders were not expected to participate in the dayto-day operations of corporate enterprises, they would receive
information about the uses of funds, earnings, assets and liabilities of
corporations. Required disclosures would provide the light". . . so that
ownership may know what is being don with its property" [Andrews,
1932, p. 354]. Auditors were closely linked to these purposes by the
requirement in these acts for an "independent" check upon the
representations of management and the profession was thereby connected
to the provision of credible financial reporting.
The emphasis upon disclosure and financial reports as a means to
control management seemed to require a third party to verify these
reports.24 This verification may be seen as an additional mechanism to
suggest that measures had been taken to prevent management
appropriation of stockholder property. Auditors were to be the
intermediaries [Miranti, 1990] between the investing public, the claimed
owners of the firm, and possibly avaricious and unscrupulous
management. As a consequence, the administrators of the Securities
Acts were also dependent upon auditors. This dependence perhaps
partially explains why the profession was able to limit its responsibility
throughout much of the period examined. While the value of "credible
financial reporting" might be used to criticize and question the
profession, it also limited the actions of government and closely linked
the State, the SEC and the audit profession.25 No alternatives were posed

23
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to replace auditors as monitoring devices for private property. Instead,
the emphasis was placed again and again upon either questioning the
auditors or upon installing particular techniques to suggest their
independence from management. The profession was criticized but never
threatened with replacement or extinction.
So we see the development and installation of new self-regulatory
practices during the 1970s occurring amidst questions about the
responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate failures.
Similar questions were raised during the 1980s amidst a myriad of
corporate failures and frauds (perhaps particularly those in the savings
and loan industry).
Auditors were again constructed as failing to
accomplish the work they had defined for themselves and were
confronted with renewed demands to alter their previously self-defined
tasks. Even then, the profession was successful in obtaining payment in
the form of liability reform in exchange for ceding some control over the
definition of its responsibilities. This paper suggests the difficulties of
altering such responsibilities for an entrenched and well-organized
profession even in instances where the definitions it forwards may starkly
contrast with those anticipated or expected by the public.
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